City-Wide Prohibition of Billboards: Police Power and the Freedom of Speech by Lifschiz, Sue Diamond
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 30 | Issue 5 Article 16
1-1979
City-Wide Prohibition of Billboards: Police Power
and the Freedom of Speech
Sue Diamond Lifschiz
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sue Diamond Lifschiz, City-Wide Prohibition of Billboards: Police Power and the Freedom of Speech, 30 Hastings L.J. 1597 (1979).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol30/iss5/16
Notes & Comments
City-Wide Prohibition of Billboards: Police Power and
the Freedom of Speech*
By Sue Diamond Lifschiz**
On November 7, 1977, the California Supreme Court heard oral
argument in the case of Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego.' The
city of San Diego had appealed from a judgment of the California
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, which declared unconstitutional the
city's ordinance prohibiting the erection and maintenance of all off-
premise advertising displays within the city limits. During the course
of the argument, Chief Justice Rose Bird asked Alan Sumption, repre-
senting the city of San Diego, "What test do we use in this case?"
'2
More than one year has elapsed since that question was asked, and the
Justices of the California Supreme Court still have not answered that
question.
The question is important and complex because its answer de-
pends upon the balancing of private property rights against the right of
local government to protect the public interest. Several basic constitu-
tional issues are involved including the permissible extent of the police
power, fifth amendment protection against both deprivation of prop-
erty without due process of law and taking of property for public use
without just compensation, and the preemption of local regulations by
state and federal law.
The issue is further complicated by a change during the past four
years in the effect courts give to first amendment freedom of speech
protections as they relate to commercial expression. First amendment
ramifications of billboard prohibition have been of only minor impor-
* While this Note was at the press, the California Supreme Court decided Me-
tromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 23 Cal. 3d 762 (1979). A discussion of that decision
appears in the author's postscript at the end of the Note.
** A.B., 1959, M.L.S., 1975, University of California at Berkeley. Member, Third
Year Class.
1. 136 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1977). By court rule, opinions of the California appellate courts
in cases granted a hearing by the supreme court are not to be published in the Official
Reports. See CAL. R. CT. 976(d). All citations to the court of appeal's opinion in
Metromedia in this Note will be to the unofficial reporter.
2. Tape of oral argument before California Supreme Court, San Diego (Nov. 7, 1977).
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tance in the past because of the long-recognized doctrine that purely
commercial speech did not fall within the ambit of first amendment
protections.3 In a series of decisions over the past few years4 the United
States Supreme Court has seriously undermined, if not totally over-
turned, this doctrine.
After a discussion of the background of the San Diego case and
the approach taken by the lower court, this Note reviews the traditional
issues presented in billboard regulation cases, including the use of the
police power to promote aesthetic values, the constitutional effect of
total prohibition, and the preemption of local legislation by federal and
state statutes. The Note next analyzes the recent United States
Supreme Court decisions concerning commercial speech. Finally, the
Note demonstrates why first amendment protections should not be per-
mitted to insulate billboards from local regulation and why the court in
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego should conclude that the public
interest protected by the city's billboard ordinance outweighs any pri-
vate right of the advertisers.
The San Diego Case
On March 14, 1972, the San Diego City Council adopted ordi-
nance 10795 in order "to eliminate excessive and confusing sign dis-
plays;" "to eliminate hazards to pedestrians and motorists;" "to
preserve and improve the appearance of the City;" and "to protect the
public health, safety and general welfare." 5 This ordinance prohibits
all outdoor advertising display signs in the city except signs that desig-
nate the owner or occupant of the premises upon which a sign is placed
or identify goods manufactured or produced or services rendered on
the premises upon which the sign is placed.6 Under the ordinance, ex-
isting signs that do not meet these requirements are declared noncon-
forming and are subject to abatement over a period of from one to four
years depending on the adjusted market value of the sign.7 The ordi-
nance requires that all off-premise signs that can be viewed from a free-
way, parkway, or scenic highway, regardless of adjusted market value,
be removed within ninety days of the effective date.8 The ordinance
does not require compensation for signs that are removed or abated.
The California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District affirmed
3. See notes 111-21 & accompanying text infra.
4. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976);
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
5. SAN DIEGO, CAL., CODE § 101.0700(A) (1972).
6. Id. § 101.0700(B).
7. Id. § 101.0700(C)-(D).
8. Id. § 101.0700(D).
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the trial court's summary judgment for the advertisers9 which was
predicated on the grounds that the ordinance was an unreasonable ex-
ercise of the police power and that it violated first amendment guaran-
tees of freedom of speech.'0 At the outset, the appellate court
dispensed with the argument that the ordinance was invalid because it
was enacted primarily to accomplish aesthetic purposes. The court ac-
cepted the city's determination that the purpose of the ordinance was to
promote safety and economic benefits as well as to enhance the com-
munity's appearance." The court also purported to recognize the pre-
sumption of validity accorded legislative action and held that "the
legislative power must be upheld 'unless manifestly abused so as to in-
fringe on constitutional guarantees.' "12
Nevertheless, the court found the ordinance to be an unreasonable
and arbitrary exercise of the police power that ran afoul of due process
because it is "too broad, too general, and too inclusive."' 3 The court
denied the municipality the power to eliminate lawful businesses en-
tirely without proof that the operation of such businesses "constitutes a
nuisance, inimical to the public welfare."' 14 The ordinance, the court
held,' 5 conflicts with the general laws of the state because under Cali-
fornia's Outdoor Advertising Act billboards "should be allowed to exist
in business areas, subject to reasonable controls in the public inter-
est." 6 While emphasizing the substantial private loss that would be
incurred under a total prohibition, the court held that the city had
9. In superior court the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment and agreed
to a joint stipulation of facts. Significant among those stipulations is that: "If enforced as
written, Ordinance No. 10795 will eliminate the outdoor advertising business in the City of
San Diego." Joint Stipulation of Facts ("J.S.F.") No. 2, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 136 Cal. Rptr. 453, 455-56 (1977). A further stipulation says: "Outdoor advertising
increases the sales of products and produces numerous direct and indirect benefits to the
public. Valuable commercial, political and social information is communicated to the pub-
lic through the use of outdoor advertising. Many businesses and politicians and other per-
sons rely upon outdoor advertising because other forms of advertising are insufficient,
inappropriate and prohibitively expensive." J.S.F. No. 28. The city may have stipulated
away its best argument in support of the ordinance; ie., that the ordinance represented no
more than a time, place, and manner regulation and that adequate alternative forms of
communication still remained. The stipulation may also have undermined any distinction
that could have been made between billboard advertising and other forms of commercial
speech to which the United States Supreme Court has been willing to accord first amend-
ment protection. See text accompanying notes 102-49 infra.
10. 136 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
11. Id at 457. As discussed in text accompanying notes 39-41 infra, it is unrealistic to
attempt to separate economic and aesthetic factors into distinct purposes.
12. Id
13. Id at 460.
14. Id
15. Id
16. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5226(b) (West 1974).
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proved neither that the advertising signs were nuisances nor that the
public benefits sought could not be achieved by "more reasonable and
less drastic measures."1 7 The court never considered whether the ordi-
nance violated first amendment protections.'
When the city appealed to the California Supreme Court, a great
deal of interest was generated both on the part of national advertising
organizations and cities throughout the state.19 The discussion that fol-
lows outlines the constitutional issues that confront the state's highest
court as it seeks to determine whether the ordinance is a permissible
exercise of the police power.
Regulation of Billboards Under the Police Power
The authority of a municipality to exercise any control over bill-
boards and other forms of outdoor advertising is derived from the local
police power. The police power is frequently defined as that power of
government inherent in sovereignty, to provide for the public order,
peace, health, safety, welfare, and morals.20 It is also invoked to pro-
mote public convenience and general prosperity.21 The California
Constitution expressly confers on municipalities the power to make and
enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances
and regulations not in conflict with general laws.
22
The reasonableness of a given regulation promulgated under the
police power is determined by whether it has some rational relation to
protection of public health, morals, safety, or general welfare.23 Courts
require only that there be a rational connection between the purpose of
the regulation and the end to be accomplished and that the means em-
ployed not be arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or discriminatory.24
A determination by a state or municipal legislative authority that a
particular measure is required under the police power is normally con-
clusive, and courts will not interfere unless such determination is
17. 136 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
18. Id. at 460-61.
19. Parties listed as amicus curiae in connection with the case include the cities of Ala-
meda, Costa Mesa, and Orange; State of California Department of Transportation; South-
ern California District Council of Laborers; Teamsters Local 986; American Association of
Advertising Agencies, Inc.; San Diego Environmental Charitable Trust; Outdoor Advertis-
ing Association of America, Inc.; Association of National Advertisers, Inc.; and Fadem, Ber-
ger & Norton, a professional corporation.
20. Tysco Oil Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 12 F. Supp. 202, 202-03 (S.D. Tex. 1935).
21. Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 142 (1912).
22. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
23. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133,
137 (1894). See generally 6 E. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.28 (rev. 3d ed.
1968).
24. 6 E. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.28 (rev. 3d ed. 1968).
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plainly erroneous. 25 In the absence of abuse of discretion, a measure
enacted under the police power is presumed to be valid, and the burden
of proof is on the party who attacks the regulation to show its invalid-
ity.26 To meet this burden of proof, the challenging party must produce
evidence that clearly, plainly, and palpably establishes the unreasona-
bleness, arbitrariness, or oppressiveness of the measure in order to
overcome the presumption of validity and to shift the burden to the
proponents of the regulation.
2 7
Moreover, police power regulations are generally interpreted in
the light of the particular needs and situation of the community in-
volved.2 8 The police power is considered an elastic, dynamic power
that can adjust to meet changing times and shifting conditions in local
communities.29
The wide application accorded the police power does not mean,
however, that it is completely beyond the supervision of the courts.
30
Local legislation is subject to judicial inquiry into whether it exceeds
constitutional limitations. An ordinance that is unreasonable, arbi-
trary, or discriminatory violates due process guaranteed by the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. 31 An ordinance may also violate other consti-
tutional provisions such as the supremacy clause and the first
amendment.
While there are many factors that may result in a court's ruling
that an ordinance is unreasonable, this discussion focuses on four ma-
jor factors as they relate to the San Diego ordinance: whether aesthet-
ics is a reasonable police power goal; whether a lawful business can be
totally prohibited throughout a community; whether the local ordi-
nance is preempted by state or federal statutes; and, finally, whether the
ordinance violates the first amendment guarantees of freedom of
speech.
25. Southern Pacific Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 13 Cal. 2d 89, 121, 87 P.2d 1055, 1071
(1939); Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 497, 515, 234 P. 388, 395-96 (1925), aff'd, 274
U.S. 325 (1926); Ex parte Hadacheck, 165 Cal. 416, 419, 132 P. 584, 586 (1913), a7'd sub
nom. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); In re Miller, 162 Cal. 687, 696, 124 P.
427, 429 (1912).
26. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962).
27. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 585 (1934); New Orleans
Pub. Serv., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 281 U.S. 682, 686 (1930).
28. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
29. Id at 387. See also Max Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal. 2d 446, 460, 55 P.2d 177,
183 (1936), a'd, 299 U.S. 198 (1936); Fourcade v. City & County of San Francisco, 196 Cal.
655, 662, 238 P. 934, 936 (1925); Miller v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 477, 484-85, 234 P.
381, 383 (1925), error dirmiissed, 273 U.S. 781 (1926); National Advertising Co. v. County of
Monterey, 211 Cal. App. 2d 375, 377, 27 Cal. Rptr. 136, 137 (1962).
30. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
31. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137
(1894).
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Aesthetics as a valid police power goal
One due process consideration that has been raised throughout the
history of billboard regulations is whether the main purpose behind the
regulation is to achieve a goal of aesthetic protection or improvement
and, if so, whether the court is willing to accept this goal as a reason-
able justification for the exercise of the police power. While it is fair to
say that protection of aesthetic values has always been a major consid-
eration behind billboard regulation, courts have been slow to recognize
it as a legitimate governmental purpose.3 2 In early cases courts went to
extreme, and what today might be considered amusing, lengths to j us-
tify billboard controls on some basis other than aesthetics. Courts up-
held regulations because billboards could be used as private privies,
hiding places for criminals, and shields for immoral practices.
33
One of the reasons that courts avoided and sometimes continue to
avoid the aesthetic justification is because aesthetic values are not nec-
essarily consistent or well defined. Aesthetic values are highly subjec-
tive, and the concept of what is beautiful or in good taste can vary
greatly from person to person and from year to year. Another reason
for avoiding aesthetic determinations is the difficulty in assessing the
value to be gained from a more aesthetically pleasing environment. It
may be difficult to weigh the benefit to the human environment against
the dollars and cents loss to an advertiser or sign owner who must re-
move a sign.
In recent years, however, courts have not been discouraged by
these difficulties in evaluation. As early as 1935 a Massachusetts court
held that consideration of taste and fitness could be a proper basis for
granting or denying permits for the location of outdoor advertising de-
vices,34 marking the first acknowledgement of aesthetics as the sole ba-
sis for sign regulation.
The United States Supreme Court issued its strongest approval of
32. An early trend was set in California when in 1909 the state supreme court held that
a sign owner could not be deprived of his property because his tastes were not like those of
his neighbors. Varney & Green v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318, 100 P. 867 (1909). "'Aesthetic
considerations are a matter of luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity, and it is neces-
sity alone which justifies the exercise of the police power to take private property without
compensation." Id at 320, 100 P. at 868 (quoting City of Passaic v. Paterson Co., 72 N.J.L.
285, 62 A. 267 (1905)). The Varney & Green position has been distinguished away by later
holdings of California courts including the appellate court holding in the Metromedia case.
See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 136 Cal. Rptr. 453, 457 (1977). See generaIy
Note, Billboard Regulations and Aesthetics, CLEV. ST. L. REV., May 1972, at 194; Comment,
Aesthetics as a Zoning Consideration, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 374 (1962).
33. Thomas Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 267 111. 344, 108 N.E. 340 (1914); St. Louis Gun-
ning Advertisement Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911).
34. General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Works, 289 Mass. 149,
193 N.E. 799 (1935).
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aesthetics as a basis for exercise of the police power in Berman v.
Parker:
35
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . .The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well
as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious
as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. ... If
those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's
Capitol shall be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the
Fifth amendment that stands in the way.
3 6
While most legal scholars now agree that aesthetics alone should
be a constitutionally permissible consideration, 37 a majority of courts
still strain to find other justifications for such statutes within the con-
cept of public health, safety, and welfare. They take the position that
aesthetics is an acceptable consideration only if it is not the sole police
power objective.
38
In general, courts appear to have a narrow concept of aesthetics.
As applied to billboards aesthetic considerations are much broader and
more significant than simply a matter of personal taste or even profes-
sional design; they are inextricably intertwined with two other crucial
factors-economics and environmental protection. The first relation-
ship was articulated by the California Court of Appeal when it said,
"Today, economic and aesthetic considerations together constitute the
nearly inseparable warp and woof of the fabric upon which the modern
city must design its future. '
39
The economic impact of aesthetics was again recognized when the
California court emphasized that unattractive billboards could have a
negative effect on the tourist industry of a particular area, thereby con-
tributing to the general economic decline of the area.40 The relation-
ship of aesthetics to the economic health of a community has been
recognized by other states as well.
41
35. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
36. Id at 33.
37. Note, Billboard Regulations and Aesthetics, CLEV. ST. L. REv., May 1972, at 194,
200.
38. Holme, Billboards and On-Premise Signs. Regulation and Elimination under the
Ffth Amendment, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMI-
NENT DOMAIN 247, 267 (1974).
39. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of Pasadena, 216 Cal. App. 2d 270, 273, 30 Cal. Rptr. 731,
733 (1963); accord, United Advertising Corp. v. Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447 (1964).
40. National Advertising Co. v. County of Monterey, 211 Cal. App. 2d 375, 379, 27
Cal. Rptr. 136, 138 (1962).
41. Thompson, Billboards Roadside Blight in the Golden State, 7 BEv. HILLS BAR J.,
Jan.-Feb. 1973, at 17, 44; Holme, Billboards and On-Premise Signs: Regulation and Elimina-
tion Under the Fifth Amendment, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZON-
ING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 247, 266 n.53 (1974).
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The other relationship, that of aesthetics and environmental pro-
tection, is bound to receive more attention from courts in future years
because of increasing judicial involvement in environmental legislation
and issues. The unaesthetic features of billboards are an important
consideration because they interfere with or detract from natural and
scenic portions of roadways and historic or culturally significant sites.
A Maryland court described this effect by finding that "emphasis
should be laid upon the character of the place as having an established
claim to consideration and upon the idea of disfigurement as distin-
guished from the falling short of some standard of beauty."
'42
The benefits of aesthetic protection have been recognized by two
states in this context, Vermont and Hawaii. Both have successfully
banned billboards throughout the entire state.43 In neither state has the
legislation been challenged by private outdoor advertising interests.44
Critics of such a widespread prohibition may argue that it is proper in
these states because of their unique natural beauty and their economic
dependence on tourism. Surely the California court could find ade-
quate support for a billboard ban in the city of San Diego for these
particular reasons. It would be unfortunate, however, for courts to ap-
ply a different criteria to only those few areas whose economy is almost
exclusively tourist oriented. Most states in this country derive a healthy
economic benefit from tourism, and all parts of the country have spe-
cial forms of natural beauty observed and enjoyed by visitors. Where
billboards and other unsightly forms of construction have been allowed
to proliferate, the inherent natural beauty of the land has been de-
stroyed or obscured.
If courts are willing to recognize the economic value of a land-
scape unadulterated by billboards for purposes of tourism, it follows
that there is an even greater and longer lasting benefit to the general
welfare of persons who live and work in a community on a daily basis.
While it should be necessary only to weigh the benefit in terms of the
well-being of the inhabitants of an area, it is also possible, if necessary,
to describe the value in terms of dollars and cents: An ugly community
is one where people do not want to live or work. It deteriorates eco-
nomically as it deteriorates physically. There is a strong economic as
well as social incentive for cities to maintain strict controls on billboard
advertising.
42. Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, Inc., 268 Md. 79, 92, 299 A.2d 828, 835 (1973) (quoting
E. FREUD, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION 115-16 (1917)).
43. HAW. REV. STAT. § 445-112 (1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, ch. 21 §§ 481-505
(1973); see 4 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW §§ 124.01-124.03 (1975);
Comment, The Regulation of Outdoor Advertising: Past, Present and Future, 6 ENVIRON.
AFFAIRS 179, 195-197 (1977).
44. Comment, The Regulation of Outdoor Advertising: Past, Present and Future, 6 EN-
VIRON. AFFAIRS 179, 197 (1977).
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The last ten years have seen a dramatic increase in the involve-
ment of local government in all kinds of land-use controls. At the same
time the science of environmental design has developed as a recognized
field of study and practice. There should no longer be any doubt that
aesthetics in its broader sense, which goes beyond mere personal taste,
is directly related to the general welfare of the community and is thus a
legitimate object of legislation under the local police power.
Total Prohibition
A second due process consideration is whether a municipality's po-
lice power can totally prohibit a particular use, industry, or activity
throughout its jurisdiction. Another way of framing this question is to
ask how far a regulation may go before it becomes a taking compensa-
ble under the fifth amendment. The exercise of the police power neces-
sarily interferes in some respects with the right of citizens to use their
own property in any manner they may see fit. This interference is usu-
ally justified on the ground that it is required to protect the property
rights of others and advance the best interests of society.45 Just because
an exercise of police power restricts individual rights to enjoyment of
property or causes inconvenience or economic loss, does not necessarily
render that exercise an unconstitutional taking per se; it may be
damnum absque injuria.46 Nevertheless, as Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, speaking for the United States Supreme Court recognized,
"The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking."47
The meaning of "too far" was further considered by the Supreme
Court in Goldblatt v. Town ofHempstead in 1962.48 In what is perhaps
the most thorough analysis that any court has given to the limits of
regulations under the police power, the Court said:
It is an oft-repeated truism that every regulation necessarily speaks
as a prohibition .... 49
"... A prohibition simply upon the use of property for pur-
poses that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the
health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense,
be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public
benefit .... ,,50
45. 6 E. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.05 (rev. 3d ed. 1968).
46. Annot., 72 A.L.R. 673 (1931). See also Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 173
(1908); Exparte Lacey, 108 Cal. 326, 330, 41 P. 411, 412-13 (1895).
47. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
48. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
49. Id at 592.
50. Id at 593 (quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887)).
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This is not to say, however, that governmental action in the form
of regulation cannot be so onerous as to constitute a taking which
constitutionally requires compensation. . . .There is no set formula
to determine where regulation ends and taking begins.5'
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that certain
kinds of businesses may be prohibited and that the "Constitution does
not guarantee the unrestricted privilege to engage in a business. ' 52 Nor
is prohibition of businesses limited to those that are nuisances per se.
The Supreme Court has upheld prohibitions of businesses lawful in
themselves. 53 There are many examples of the community-wide prohi-
bition of legitimate businesses other than billboards. Courts have up-
held total bans of trailer parks,54 outdoor storage of vehicles,
55
apartment houses, 56 auto wreckers, 5
7 and recreational facilities.58
The reasonableness of a total city-wide ban on billboards is pre-
cisely the issue which faces the California Supreme Court in Me-
tromedia v. City of San Diego. The appellate court considered this the
decisive factor when it held San Diego's ordinance invalid, and ex-
pressly stated that its chief concern was with the broad sweep of the
ordinance.
59
The only former occasion on which the California Supreme Court
considered an ordinance absolutely prohibiting billboards for advertis-
ing purposes was 1909 in Varney & Green v. Williams,60 when the stat-
ute was held invalid. The appellate court in Metromedia refused to
accept the city's assertion that Varney & Green is no longer controlling
on this issue because Varney was decided before judicial acceptance of
comprehensive zoning and before significant automobile traffic and ur-
ban congestion.61 The court instead shifted the burden to the city to
51. Id. at 594.
52. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 527 (1934).
53. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 632-33 (1951) ("The Constitution's protection
of property rights does not make a state or a city impotent to guard its citizens against the
annoyances of life because the regulation may restrict the manner of doing a legitimate
business. . . .[W]e think that even a legitimate occupation may be restricted or prohibited
in the public interest."); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410-11 (1915); Reinman v.
Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 176 (1915).
54. Vickers v. Township Comm. of Gloucester Township, 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129
(1962).
55. New York Cent. R.R. v. Borough of Ridgefield, 84 N.J. Super. 85, 201 A.2d 67
(App. Div. 1964).
56. Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrouck Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749 (1958).
57. Oregon City v. Hartke, 240 Or. 35, 400 P.2d 255 (1965).
58. Town of Los Altos Hills v. Adobe Creek Properties, Inc., 32 Cal. App. 3d 488, 108
Cal. Rptr. 271 (1973). See generally A. BELIN, M. BILo'rTo & T. CARHART, A LEGAL
HANDBOOK FOR BILLBOARD CONTROL 62-66 (1976).
59. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 136 Cal. Rptr. 453, 458 (1977).
60. 155 Cal. 318, 100 P. 867 (1909).
61. 136 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
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prove that "the public benefits sought cannot be achieved by more rea-
sonable and less drastic measures. ' 62 Absent such a showing, the court
held, the city's power to regulate lawful businesses could not be used to
eliminate them entirely unless such businesses constitute nuisances or
"it is reasonably necessary to remove all of them to promote safety,
general economic interests, or even aesthetic values.
'63
The California Supreme Court, in resolving this issue, must deal
with its own seventy-year-old decision and the United States Supreme
Court's imprecise criteria. If it looks to other jurisdictions for guidance
it will find contrary results from two state supreme courts, each ruling
on the total prohibition issue within a few months of one another.
In Combined Communications Corp. v. City and County of
Denver,64 the Colorado Supreme Court applied a reasonableness stan-
dard to invalidate an ordinance that mandated removal of billboards
throughout the city, thereby prohibitng the entire industry from operat-
ing within the city. The court conceded, however, that it might be ap-
propriate to prohibit billboards in certain segments of a city or in cities
that are predominantly residential in character.
6 5
When the same issues were raised before the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, in John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Ad-
vertising Board,66 the opposite result obtained. The court found that
"the unlimited and unqualified power to regulate and restrict [granted
to the Legislature by the State Constitution] can be, for practical pur-
poses, the power to prohibit."67 Here, as in Combined Communications,
the court applied a reasonableness test and accorded the by-law a pre-
sumption of validity.6 8 In upholding the total prohibition the court
gave broad approval to aesthetic considerations as the sole justification
for such a prohibition.69 The court then addressed directly the issue
whether a total prohibition might be more reasonable in a small rural
town or village than in an urban area.
Opponents of prohibitory sign ordinances argue that every case in
which such an ordinance has been upheld has involved a small or
predominantly residential town.70 The Donnelly court refused to ac-
62. Id at 460.
63. Id
64. 542 P.2d 79 (Colo. 1975).
65. Id at 82.
66. 339 N.E.2d 709 (Mass. 1975).
67. Id at 715.
68. Id at 716.
69. Id at 716-19.
70. See, e.g., Murphy, Inc. v. Westport, 131 Conn. 294, 40 A.2d 177 (1944); Rocking-
ham Hotel Co. v. North Hampton, 101 N.H. 441, 146 A.2d 253 (1958); United Advertising
Corp. v. Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447 (1964); United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of
Raritan, 11 NJ. 144, 93 A.2d 362 (1952); Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d
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cept this distinction and held:
We believe that it is within the scope of the police power for the town
to decide that its total living area should be improved so as to be
more attractive to both its residents and visitors. Whether an area is
urban, suburban, or rural should not be determinative of whether the
residents are entitled to preserve and enhance their environment.
Urban residents are not immune to ugliness.
7 1
Not only did the Donnelly court accept a total prohibition, it did so in
complete awareness of the first amendment considerations. 72 Although
it recognized that commercial advertising is no longer stripped of all
first amendment protection, the Massachusetts court held that "a State
may legitimately regulate or even prohibit advertising if the First
Amendment interest is outweighed by the governmental interest.
73
The first amendment interest was outweighed in this case, the court
found, because the signs to be prohibited contained "purely commer-
cial copy," and that any public service function was only incidental to
the commercial message.
74
The California Supreme Court will have to decide which line of
reasoning to accept. There are no distinguishing features in the facts of
the two cases, nor any other basis on which to reconcile the differing
outcomes. Both the Massachusetts and Colorado courts have cited ade-
quate precedent to support the results reached. 75 While the California
749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967). For a list of cases where citywide exclusion of billboards has
been invalidated, see Holme, Billboards and On-Premise Signs: Regulation and Elimination
Under the Fifth Amendment, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING,
AND EMINENT DOMAIN 247, 282 n.104 (1974).
71. 339 N.E.2d at 720.
72. Id at 721. Here the court recognized the establishment of a new attitude toward
commercial speech in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), but distinguished that case.
The Colorado court, on the other hand, did not even find it necessary to address the first
amendment issue.
73. 339 N.E.2d at 721.
74. Id. at 721-22. The court also recognized the public's right to privacy from unsolic-
ited advertisements.
75. Cases in other jurisdictions which have held unconstitutional municipal ordinances
totally banning outdoor advertising displays within the entire limits of a city include Central
Advertising Co. v. City of Ann Arbor, 391 Mich. 533, 218 N.W.2d 27 (1974); Norate Corp. v.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 417 Pa. 397, 207 A.2d 890 (1965); Daikeler v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjust. of Montgomery Township, I Pa. Commw. Ct. 445, 275 A.2d 696 (1971). In
Daikeler, the court both altered the standard of proof and shifted the burden of proof: "In
short, the prohibition of a legitimate business use such as off-site advertising signs, through-
out an entire municipality, must bear a more substantial relationship to health, safety and
general welfare than partial prohibitions where the business is permitted in another district
of that municipality. Where there is a total exclusion, no matter how it is accomplished, the
municipality must bring forward sufficient and valid reasons for the prohibition. It must
further demonstrate that these reasons cannot be satisfied by thoughtful regulation short of
prohibition and that the prohibition does not arbitrarily discriminate against that business."
Id at 454, 275 A.2d at 699-700. Conversely, a city-wide prohibition of off-premise signs has
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court may find more physical similarities between the cities of Safi Di-
ego and Denver, Colorado than between San Diego and Brookline,
Massachusetts, the Massachusetts court has made clear that its decision
does not rest on the size or rural, urban, or suburban nature of
community.
76
A comparison of these two opinions demonstrates that the unani-
mous decision of the Massachusetts court is the more thoroughly rea-
soned and persuasive of the two, in that in determining the
reasonableness of total prohibition it weighed the various conflicting
interests and relevant factors. As the dissent in Combined
Communications points out, the Colorado court failed to engage in an
adequate balancing.
77
Preemption: Effect of State and Federal Statutes
Another important issue facing the California Supreme Court in
the Metromedia case is the effect of both state and federal statutes pur-
porting to regulate billboards. These statutes raise three questions:
First, do the statutes preempt any local regulation of billboards? Sec-
ond, if not, do the statutes require compensation for signs removed
under the local police power? Finally, what is the effect of the statutes'
recognition of outdoor advertising as a legitimate industry on a munici-
pality's efforts to eliminate all billboards within its borders?
Prior to 1965, regulation of billboards was considered strictly a lo-
cal concern, an appropriate object of the municipal police power as
long as it did not offend constitutional protections. In 1965 Congress
enacted the Highway Beautification Act.78 This Act provides that fed-
eral highway funds apportioned to any state be reduced by ten percent
if that state fails to effectively control the erection and maintenance of
outdoor advertising signs within 660 feet from an interstate highway.
79
Under the act "effective control" means limiting allowable signs to
those that are directional, official, or which advertise on-premise activi-
ties80 or those that are located in unzoned areas or in areas zoned in-
dustrial or commercial. 81 The Act provides a five-year grace period for
been upheld in Murphy, Inc. v. Westport, 131 Conn. 294,40 A.2d 177 (1944); United Adver-
tising Corp. v. Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447 (1964); United Advertising Corp. v. Bor-
ough of Raritan, I 1 N.J. 144, 93 A.2d 362 (1952); and Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263,
225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967).
76. 339 N.E.2d at 720.
77. Combined Communications Corp. v. Denver, 542 P.2d 79, 84 (Colo. 1975) (Kelley,
J., dissenting).
78. Pub. L. No. 89-285, 79 Stat. 1028 (codified at 23 U.S.C. §§ 131-136 (1977)).
79. 23 U.S.C. § 131(b) (1977).
80. Id § 131(c).
81. Id § 131(d).
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comlliance.82 Additionally, section 131(g) provides that just compen-
sation be paid for signs that were lawfully erected, seventy-five percent
of the compensation to be appropriated from federal funds. Section
131(k) provides that the Act does not prohibit states from imposing
stricter limitations on signs on the federal-aid highway systems. In
1968 subsection (n) was added, providing that no sign shall be removed
under the Act if the federal share of just compensation is not
available.
8 3
It is ironic that this Act, designed to discourage the proliferation of
unsightly billboards along highways, has in many ways made the re-
moval of such structures more difficult under local regulations.84 This
result occurs because the Act raises questions of preemption over local
statutes. Also, by providing for compensation for billboards that are
removed, the Act further confuses the distinction between a permissible
exercise of the police power and an unconstitutional taking without just
compensation in violation of the fifth amendment. The provisions of
this Act that require a penalty of ten percent funding if just compensa-
tion is not paid are clearly in conflict with the police power under
which municipalities can require removal without compensation. The
question that has arisen since adoption of the Act is: Can a state or city
that has a constitutional statute or ordinance requiring the removal of
certain billboards still remove those billboards that fall under the pur-
view of the federal Act without paying just compensation and without
sacrificing any federal aid highway funds? There is a split of authority
on this question.
According to the United States Attorney General, a state that
under its own law can remove billboards by an exercise of the police
power is nevertheless not exempt from the Act's conditional require-
ment of compensation. 85 The United States Court of Appeal for the
Tenth Circuit, however, upheld an ordinance that required the removal
of signs without compensation and found that there was no preemption
by the Federal Highway Beautification Act nor any example or stan-
82. Id § 131(e).
83. Pub. L. No. 90-495, § 6(d), 82 Stat. 817 (amending 23 U.S.C. § 131). Federal fund-
ing has been erratic and inadequate. See A. REITZE, ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING 1-61
(1974). CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5417 (West 1974) provides that where compensation is
required by federal law, no display can be removed unless or until federal funds have been
received.
84. According to George Inturff, of the Federal Highway Administration Beautifica-
tion Department, it is probable that there were more billboards in 1972 than in 1965 when
the Act was passed. The Outdoor Advertising Association of America, which represents the
nation's major builders, renters and users of billboards, listed 264,000 billboards in 1969 and
272,000 in 1971. Between 1969 and 1970 the outdoor advertising industry revenues jumped
nearly 12%. Washington Post, May 7, 1972, § M, at 1.
85. 42 Op. Ar'y GEN. 26 (1966).
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dard therein binding on the city.8 6 The United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari.
8 7
A similar conflict existed in the state of Washington where the
state law regulated billboards under the police power without requiring
the payment of compensation for any losses caused.88 This Act was
attacked as preempted by the federal Act.89 The state supreme court
held that Congress had not preempted the field of regulation covered
by the state Act.90
Because Washington's legislation is substantially different from
the federal statute, this holding may not be compelling in states such as
California where the provisions of the Outdoor Advertising Act of
196791 and the federal statute are essentially the same. A municipality
seeking to control billboards under the exercise of its police power faces
possible preemption by the force of both statutes. In its statement of the
necessity of regulation of advertising adjacent to highways, the Califor-
nia legislature, yielding to pressure from the powerful advertising
lobby, wrote into the act that outdoor advertising is "a legitimate com-
mercial use of property adjacent to roads and highways," an "integral
part of the business and marketing function and an established segment
of the national economy," and "should be allowed to exist in business
areas."'92 This wording has far-reaching implications, because, by es-
tablishing advertising as a legitimate industry, it effectively precludes
the elimination of billboards as a nuisance per se unless they violate the
Act.
93
The California statute is broad in its application. Section 5227
provides: "[i]t is the intention of the Legislature to occupy the whole
field of regulation by the provisions of this chapter. . . ."94 This pro-
vision is seemingly contradicted by another section95 that supports the
federal intent to pay just compensation while still reserving the state's
power relating to the removal of advertising displays under the police
86. Art Neon Co. v. City and County of Denver, 488 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1973).
87. 417 U.S. 932 (1974).
88. Highway Advertising Control Act of 1961, WASH. REv. CODE § 47.42 (1970).
89. Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968), appeal
dismissed, 393 U.S. 316 (1969).
90. Id at 419, 439 P.2d at 257.
91. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 5200-5363, 5400-5406 (West 1974). See generally
Note, State and Local Billboard Control in California, 11 CAL. W.L. REV. 193 (1974). The
California act is patterned largely after the federal act, and like the federal act, was the
product of much political bargaining. See generally Thompson, Billboards Roadside Blight
in the Golden State, BEv. HILLS. B.J., Jan.-Feb. 1973, at 17.
92. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 5226(a)-(b) (West 1974).
93. Id § 5412.
94. Id § 5227.
95. Id § 5412.
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power where the federal Act does not provide for compensation. 96 In
further conflict is section 5230, which explicitly recognizes that a local
governing body may impose restrictions equal to or greater than those
imposed by the Act.97 This apparent contradiction has led to confusion
in interpretation of the Act. The California Attorney General analyzed
the relationship between the federal and state Acts and concluded that
displays covered by the federal Act could not be removed by local enti-
ties through the exercise of the zoning power without compensation,
but that other displays could.98
In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, many of the billboards
that would be removed by the city's ordinance fall within the provi-
sions of the federal and state Acts. Part of the appellate court's ration-
ale in holding San Diego's regulatory ordinance unconstitutional was
that the total prohibition directly conflicted with Business and Profes-
sions Code section 5226 which allows signs to exist in business areas99
and that it also does not comply with the federal and state statutes'
requirements for just compensation. °0
One writer has called for legislative reform in the form of repeal or
modification of the existing statutes because of the conflict inherent in
them and the difficulty that courts are having in squaring them with
local controls exercised under the police power.' 0 ' First amendment
considerations relevant to the billboard-control problem should en-
courage a reevaluation of the legislation.
The appellate court in Metromedia invalidated the San Diego or-
dinance as an improper exercise of the police power because it was too
broad and inclusive and in conflict with the state statute. It did not,
therefore, find it necessary to consider whether there was an infringe-
ment of the first amendment. It is likely that the California Supreme
Court will consider this critical aspect of the problem on appeal, espe-
cially if it does not find the ordinance to be an impermissible exercise
of the police power.
First Amendment Considerations
The Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court
Although the first amendment contains the absolute requirement
that "Congress shall make no law . . abridging the freedom of
96. Id.
97. Id § 5230.
98. 55 OP. CAL. Ar'Y GEN. 1 (1972).
99. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 136 Cal. Rptr. 453, 459 (1977).
100. Id at 459-60.
101. Note, State and Local Billboard Control in California, 11 CAL. W.L. REV. 193, 207
(1974).
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speech, or of the press," the Supreme Court has always considered
some regulation of speech desirable.'0 2 Speech is not protected, for ex-
ample when it consists of fighting words 0 3 or when it is obscene, 104
libelous, 105 part of the commission of an illegal act, '0 6 or false and mis-
leading. 0 7 Through the years the Court has used a variety of tests,
including the "bad tendency test,"' 08 the "clear and present danger
test," 0 9 and the "ad hoc balancing test""I0 to uphold laws limiting free-
dom of speech and of the press.
The Supreme Court carved out another exception in 1942 in Val-
entine v. Chrestensen"I when it exempted from first amendment pro-
tection speech that does nothing more than propose a commercial
transaction. Mr. Chrestensen passed out handbills in New York to at-
tract visitors to his submarine in violation of a local ordinance that
prohibited the distribution on the streets of "commercial and business
advertising matter." The reverse side of Chrestensen's handbill con-
tained a protest against the city Dock Department for refusing him
wharfage facilities at a city pier for exhibition of the submarine.
Chrestensen was granted an injunction against the enforcement of
the handbill ordinance. The city appealed, and the case eventually
reached the Supreme Court. Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous
court in a brief opinion, stated that although the streets could not be
entirely closed to general communication of information, "the Consti-
tution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely com-
mercial advertising.""1
2
The Court did not recognize the concept of the public streets as a
forum for the exchange of communication. Rather it found Chresten-
sen's attempts to communicate an invasion of others' rights to free use
of the thoroughfares.
The question is not whether the legislative body may interfere with
the harmless pursuit of a lawful business, but whether it must permit
102. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961). See generally T.
EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 47-63 (1967); Hunter,
Prescrqflion Drugs and Open Housing" More on Commercial Speech, 25 EMORY L.J. 815, 818
(1976).
103. Chaplinski v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
104. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
105. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
106. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
107. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S.
36 (1961).
108. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 262 U.S. 652 (1925).
109. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
110. See, e-g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
111. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
112. Id at 54. The Court left to legislative judgment the question whether the pursuit of
a gainful occupation in the streets could be regulated or proscribed.
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such pursuit by what it deems an undesirable invasion of, or interfer-
ence with, the full and free use of the highways by the people in
fulfillment of the public use to which streets are dedicated.' 13
In spite of criticism by judges, scholars, and students for its failure to
adequately define commercial speech or to delineate the scope of pro-
tection to be afforded, 1 4 the Chrestensen case has, until very recently,
remained authority and has effectively kept the first amendment issue
out of billboard regulation cases. In the years following its Chrestensen
decision the Supreme Court continued to struggle with the application
of first amendment protections to forms of speech that were in some
way deemed commercial.1
5
The weight of the balance began to shift in New York Times v.
Sullivan." 6 There the Court declined to apply its Chrestensen doctrine
to sustain a libel action against a newspaper that published a paid polit-
ical advertisement criticizing police action directed against members of
the civil rights movement. The Court focused on the content of the
advertisement and found that the publication was not a commercial
advertisement in the Chrestensen sense because it "communicated in-
formation, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed
abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose
existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and
113. Id. at 54-55. Nor was the Court impressed by Chrestensen's belated efforts to turn
his commercial advertisement into a political protest statement. The Court stated: "It is
enough for the present purpose that the stipulated facts justify the conclusion that the affix-
ing of the protest against official conduct to the advertising circular was with the intent, and
for the purpose, of evading the prohibition of the ordinance. If that evasion were successful.
every merchant who desires to broadcast advertising leaflets in the streets need only to ap-
pend a civic appeal, or a moral platitude, to achieve immunity from the law's command."
Id
114. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace. Commercial Speech and the Val-
ues of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 450 (1971). See also Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 371, 397-98 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing) and 413 U.S. at 401 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S.
898, 904-06 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Cammarano v. United
States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The ruling was casual, almost
offhand. And it has not survived reflection."); Rotunda, The Commercial Speech Doctrine in
the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080, 1083; Note, Commercial Speech-An End in
Sight to Chrestensen?, 23 DE PAUL L. REV. 1258, 1262 (1974); 61 CORNELL L. REV. 640
(1976); 37 LA. L. REV. 263, 264 (1976).
115. For instance, in 1951 the Court decided Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622
(1951), a case which involved door-to-door solicitation of magazines and newspaper sub-
scriptions. As in Chrestensen, the controversial material was published and disseminated for
profit-making purposes, and the Court again refused to recognize any protection. The Court
reasoned that solicitors of magazines were not entitled to invoke freedom of the press any
more than "solicitors for gadgets or brushes," id. at 641, and held that a householder's desire
for privacy outweighed any first amendment rights, id. at 644.




Content was again at issue in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Commission on Human Relations.18 In a five-to-four decision" 9 the
Court upheld an ordinance that forbade help-wanted advertisements in
sex-designated columns where the jobs advertised did not require bona
fide occupational qualifications based on gender. Holding that the ad-
vertisements were of the Chrestensen type rather than the Sullivan type,
the Court found them to be "classic examples of commercial
speech."' 20 The Court refused to abrogate the distinction between
commercial and other speech in this context because the publication of
sex-designated want ads is not only commercial activity, but is discrim-
inatory and therefore illegal commercial activity. This illegality ne-
gates any first amendment interest that might be protected in ordinary
commercial advertisement.'
21
Against the background of the Chrestensen case as interpreted by
Sullivan, and Pittsburgh Press, the Court approached three major cases
in as many years that would dramatically change the treatment of first
amendment protections of commercial speech. Most observers believe
that the cumulative effect of these three cases sounds the death knell of
the commercial-speech doctrine enunciated in Chrestensen.
The first of this series was Bigelow v. Virginia.'22 Plaintiff in that
case was editor of the Virginia Weekly, a newspaper published in Vir-
ginia, which carried a paid advertisement announcing placement in
New York hospitals for the purpose of obtaining an abortion. The
Supreme Court of Virginia upheld Bigelow's conviction 2 3 for violation
of a Virginia statute that made it a misdemeanor, by the sale or circula-
tion of any publication, to encourage or prompt the procuring of an
abortion. 2 4
During the pendency of Bigelow's appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, that Court decided two cases that had the effect of le-
galizing abortions under certain conditions, 25 and the Court remanded
Bigelow's case for further consideration by the Virginia court in the
light of those decisions. Again, the Virginia court affirmed the convic-
tion, and Bigelow again appealed to the Supreme Court.
117. Id at 266.
118. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
119. Justices Burger, Douglas, Stewart, and Blackmun dissented.
120. 413 U.S. at 385. Even the newspaper's editorial function was not sufficient to lift
the advertisements from the category of commercial speech and place them under the pro-
tection of the first amendment.
121. Id at 388.
122. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
123. 213 Va. 191, 191 S.E.2d 173 (1972).
124. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-63 (1974).
125. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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In an apparent broad departure from Chrestensen, the Court held
that the commercial aspects of a paid advertisement, including the fact
that the motive of the advertisement involved financial gain, did not
negate all first amendment guarantees. 126 The Court distinguished the
advertisement in question from those involved in Chrestensen and Pitts-
burgh Press because it "contained factual material of clear 'public in-
terest' "1127 and because it "pertained to constitutional interests."'
' 28
Bringing commercial speech within the protected sphere of Holmes' fa-
mous analogy, the Court found that the "relationship of speech to the
marketplace of products or of services does not make it valueless in the
marketplace of ideas."1
29
The commercial speech issue came before the Supreme Court
again in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. '30 At issue there was the constitutionality of a Virginia
statute that declared it unprofessional conduct for a licensed pharma-
cist to advertise the prices of prescription drugs.
In holding the statute unconstitutional, the Court dismissed the
Chrestensen commercial-speech doctrine as "simplistic.' 3' It inter-
preted the Pittsburgh Press refusal to accord first amendment guaran-
tees as based not on the commercial aspects of the advertisement, but
rather on the illegality of the activity advertised. The Court built upon
and broadened its recent decision in Bigelow v. Virginia while conced-
ing that "[s]ome fragment of hope for the validity of a 'commercial
speech' exception arguably might have persisted because of the subject
matter of the advertisement in Bigelow."'
132
In Virginia Board of Pharmacy the Court purported to face directly
the question of whether wholly commercial speech, speech that does no
more than propose a commercial transaction, is outside the protection
of the first amendment. 33 The Court focused on society's strong inter-
est in the free flow of commercial information but held that it really
was unimportant whether or not any given commercial message con-
126. 421 U.S. at 818.
127. Id at 822.
128. Id In their dissent Justices Rehnquist and White criticized the majority opinion for
distinguishing fcr first amendment purposes on the basis of content. They argued that the
fact that the advertisement was for abortion referral services did not diminish its commercial
aspects. The dissenting justices found a "classic commercial proposition directed towards
the exchange of services rather than the exchange of ideas" which, just as in Chrestensen, did
not lose its predominately commercial context because it involved some expression of opin-
ion. Id at 831-32.
129. Id. at 826.
130. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
131. Id at 759 ("Last term, in Bigelow v. Virginia ... the notion of unprotected 'com-
mercial speech' all but passed from the scene.").
132. Id. at 760.
133. Id. at 761.
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tained a public interest element and refused to draw a line, as it had in
Bigelow, between those advertisements that are "publicly interesting"
or "important" and those that are not.
134
In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,135 the
United States Supreme Court's most significant treatment of the com-
mercial-speech issue, the Court refused to uphold a New Jersey town-
ship ordinance that prohibited the posting of "For Sale" or "Sold"
signs on residential property even though the recognized legislative ob-
jective was to stem panic selling resulting from the flight of white
homeowners from a racially integrated community. The Court recog-
nized the departure from the commercial-speech doctrine as repre-
sented by the decisions in the Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy cases,
and further developed its new approach to placing commercial
messages within the ambit of first amendment protections.
An analysis of the new doctrine as it developed through these
three cases illustrates many ways in which the new approach is not ap-
plicable to billboard regulation cases. The Bigelow decision leaves the
door open for reasonable government regulation of commercial speech.
While commentators differ as to the effect of Bigelow on the older com-
mercial-speech doctrine, 136 there is enough significant language in the
case to suggest that it alone is not sufficient authority to support first
amendment protection in billboard cases.
The Court adopted a balancing position, weighing the first amend-
ment interest against the governmental interest served by the regula-
tion. 1 37 The Court recognized that there are cases when the state may
regulate or even prohibit the advertisement of commercial activities but
refused to determine precisely in what instances such regulation will
outweigh first amendment interests.' 38 Although the Court found that
in this case the state's interest in regulating the particular activity ad-
vertised was entitled to little weight, it did indicate that certain govern-
mental interests will prevail over first amendment protections. For
134. Id at 765. Justice Rehnquist again dissented, criticizing the decision for elevating
"commercial intercourse between a seller hawking his wares and a buyer seeking to strike a
bargain to the same plane as has been previously reserved for the free marketplace of ideas."
Id at 781. In refusing to extend Holmes' famous analogy to include purely commercial
transactions, he stated, "I had understood this view to relate to public decisionmaking as to
political, social, and other public issues, rather than the decision of a particular individual as
to whether to purchase one or another kind of shampoo." Id at 787.
135. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
136. See Alexander, Speech in the Local Marketplace: Implications of Virginia Slate
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. for Local Regulatory Power,
14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 357, 363 (1977); Hunter, Prescrition Drugs and Open Housing. More
on Commercial Speech, 25 EMORY L.J 815, 825 (1976); Rotunda, The Commercial Speech
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080, 1096.
137. 421 U.S. at 826.
138. Id. at 825-26.
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example, those situations where an advertisement would invade the
privacy of other citizens or thrust the advertiser's message upon a cap-
tive audience were expressly distinguished.
39
The Court also pointed out that the first amendment overtones
were more serious in Bigelow's case because the statute was applied
against him as publisher and editor of a newspaper, not as an adver-
tiser, 40 a consideration that places this case under the special constitu-
tional protections traditionally afforded the press. On the other hand,
this factor has no relevance to billboard cases where the regulatory stat-
utes are applied directly against advertisers and "freedom of the press"
is not involved.
Even though Virginia State Board of Pharmacy goes considerably
further than Bigelow in applying first amendment protections to com-
mercial speech, there are certain reservations in the opinion that could
well have a bearing on the holding's applicability to billboard cases.
The Court stated, "In concluding that commercial speech, like other
varieties, is protected, we of course do not hold that it can never be
regulated in any way." ' 4' The Bigelow approach, which focused on the
content of the advertisement to justify affording it first amendment pro-
tection, was expressly disavowed by the Court here. In this case the
Court approved time, place, and manner restrictions "provided that
they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech, that they serve a significant governmental interest, and that in
so doing they leave open ample alternative channels for communica-
tion of the information."'
142
Billboard regulations have uniformly been of the type that attempt
to control time, place, and manner; most ordinances restricting bill-
boards do so by placing limits on their height, overall size, or location.
Municipalities have not attempted to control billboards by regulating
the content of the material that is advertised on them. In this respect,
the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy decision approves the kind of
regulations that are normally applied to billboards.
Another important aspect of the case distinguishes it from bill-
board cases. Any restriction on information concerning the price of
prescription drugs necessarily works the greatest hardship on those
groups that can least afford it, the poor, the sick, and the aged-the
people who brought the suit and who claimed their right to the free
flow of commercial information. 143 A recognition of their special needs
139. Id at 828 (distinguishing Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Lehman v.
City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932)).
140. 421 U.S. at 828.
141. 425 U.S. at 770.
142. Id. at 771.
143. Id at 763.
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could well have been a controlling factor in this decision-a factor that
is essentially absent in billboard cases.
Finally, in its Linmark decision, the Court still left open two broad
areas for governmental regulation of commercial speech that it had ap-
proved in the Virginia Pharmacy case and that are critical to billboard
control. The Court approved restrictions when alternative channels of
communication remain open and also where the restriction is designed
to promote a value not related to the suppression of free expression,
such as time, place, and manner restrictions to protect unwilling view-
ers or promote aesthetic values.44
Respondents in Linmark attempted to distinguish the facts in that
case from Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy because the ordinance re-
stricted only one method of communication. Rejecting this argument,
the Court recognized here, as it did in Virginia Board of Pharmacy, that
time, place, and manner restrictions of speech do not violate the first
amendment where they leave open alternative channels of communica-
tion.' 45 In this case, however, the Court found that alternative methods
available for communicating information about home sales were not
satisfactory. Practically speaking, this means of identifying homes for
sale is far superior to other methods both from the buyer's and the
seller's points of view.
The issue of satisfactory alternatives is crucial also to the San Di-
ego case. There the appellate court focused on the fact that the Califor-
nia legislature has determined that outdoor advertising is a legitimate
business and that prohibition of all unofficial, off-premise signs will op-
erate to eliminate the outdoor advertising business in the city of San
Diego. 46 Whether or not the outdoor advertising business is a distinct
and separate industry is a matter of semantics that has no actual bear-
ing on the issue of alternative channels of communication. In its analy-
sis on appeal the California Supreme Court will have to determine
whether the many means of communication unaffected by the ordi-
nance, including newspapers, magazines, radio, television, and on-
premise and other permissible signs, provide alternative channels of
communication and whether, as in Linmark, the alternatives are
unsatisfactory.
In Linmark the Court held the ordinance unconstitutional mainly
because it restricted the free flow of "truthful and legitimate commer-
cial" information important to decisions that the residents must
144. 431 U.S. at 93.
145. Id The court added, "This distinction is not without significance to First Amend-
ment analysis, since laws regulating time, place or manner of speech stand on a different
footing than laws prohibiting speech altogether." Id
146. See note 9 supra.
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make. 47 The Court refused to allow the proscription of this particular
type of sign because it was based on content rather than on form. Of
particular significance in relation to the billboard issue is the Court's
statement that "the township has not prohibited all lawn signs--or all
lawn signs of a particular size or shape-in order to promote aesthetic
values or any other value 'unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion.' "148 In a footnote the court added: "Accordingly we do not de-
cide whether a ban on signs or a limitation on the number of signs
could survive constitutional scrutiny if it were unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression."'1
49
The Court indicated in dictum that a regulatory ordinance
designed to protect the unwilling viewer from exposure is the kind of
time, place, and manner restriction that does not necessarily interfere
with first amendment rights.150 The discussion further suggests that
when the "place or manner of the speech produces a detrimental 'sec-
ondary effect' on society," a municipality is justified in enforcing rea-
sonable controls.' 5' This dictum lends strong support to the argument
that regulation or even total prohibition of billboards can be justified
on the basis that it is merely a time, place, and manner restriction that
is designed to promote aesthetic values or to protect the privacy of un-
willing viewers.
Commercial Speech-A Policy for Billboard Cases
The new commercial-speech doctrine as developed by Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy, Bigelow v. Virginia, and Linmark, affords
some first amendment protection to purely commercial speech and will
without doubt have an effect on billboard regulation cases. It is clear
that courts will no longer be able to dismiss first amendment considera-
tions as cavalierly as they have in the past. The issue of how these
considerations will be treated remains unresolved. In its development
of the new doctrine, the United States Supreme Court has not yet pro-
vided any criteria that clearly define the degree of first amendment pro-
tections that apply to billboard-type advertisements.
In considering the extent to which first amendment protections ap-
ply to regulatory, or even prohibitory, billboard ordinances, courts
should be cautious not to rely on labels and cliches such as "purely
commercial speech" and "marketplace of ideas" to formulate a new
approach that is likely to be applied far in excess of what the courts
anticipated and what the Constitution justifies. Nor should courts ap-
147. 431 U.S. at 96.
148. Id at 93.
149. Id. at 94 n.7.




ply the theories enunciated in the three recent United States Supreme
Court cases without a careful consideration of the practical and philo-
sophical distinctions between the types of commercial speech afforded
protection by those cases and the type of commercial speech exempli-
fied by billboard advertisements.
There are distinctions between the use of speech for commercial
advertisements and other kinds of speech that warrant special protec-
tion for the latter and not for the former. Professor Edwin Baker, in a
thoughtful article on this subject, explains the difference as follows:
"[P]rofit-motivated or commercial speech lacks the crucial connections
with individual liberty and self-realization-which exist for speech gen-
erally, and which are central to justifications for the constitutional pro-
tection of speech, justifications which in turn define the proper scope of
protection under the first amendment."
152
Courts are now using Justice Holmes' "marketplace of ideas" im-
age to philosophically justify protection of product advertising under
the first amendment. 153 It may turn out that Justice Holmes' choice of
words was unfortunate in that it now appears that courts, even the
Supreme Court, are misinterpreting the marketplace model as though it
were intended to equate speech of social or political import to speech
that is aimed at selling a product. The distinction remains: Protected
speech is that which sells ideas, philosophies, or the speech itself. Com-
mercial speech is dominated by a profit motive which "breaks the con-
nection between speech and any vision, or attitude, or value of the
individual or group engaged in advocacy."' 154 The seller of a product
need not believe in the product or even think it will be useful to the
prospective buyer.
There are those who will argue that this distinction between differ-
ent kinds of speech should not be made and that information about
products is just as important if not more so than information about
politics, art, and philosophy. Today there is increasing emphasis on
consumerism as a science and as an essential tool for helping people
play a full role in society. One cannot disagree with the conclusion that
commercial expression about the safety, cost, and quality of consumer
products is a matter of crucial public concern. 155 It has been argued
152. Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory ofFreedom, 62 IowA L. REV.
1, 3 (1976).
153. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[Tqhe best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market."). See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-78 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
154. Baker, Commercial Speech: 4 Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L. REV.
1, 17 (1976).
155. See, Annot., 37 L. Ed. 1124, 1129 (1974). See also Hunter, Prescription Drugs and
Open Housing: More on Commercial Speech, 25 EMORY L.J. 815, 821-22 (1976); Redish, The
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that the reasons for protecting speech include the facilitation of self-
expression, self-realization, and needed societal change and that the
availability of adequate commercial information accomplishes all these
things. 156 One critic claims that "commercial speech aids in the attain-
ment of society's goal of intellectual self-fulfillment. . . helps the indi-
vidual to rationally plan his life. . .[and] serves an important function
as a catalyst in the achievement of personal self-realization.
'157
This dramatic claim is more idealistic than realistic, especially as it
relates to typical billboard advertising. The goal of billboard advertis-
ing is necessarily to get the image of the product before the viewer's
eyes as quickly and indelibly as possible. Billboards rarely contain
price information or other details about the quality of the product that
the viewer can use as a basis for comparison with other brands or prod-
ucts. More often than not, billboards do not even offer information
about where an advertised product can be purchased.
Rather than aiding the individual "towards the intangible goal of
rational self-fulflUment,"1 58 billboards can create artificial and unreal-
istic desires for luxury products and encourage viewers to overspend,
thereby placing themselves in insecure financial positions. Madison
Avenue has generated all its talent to display products in their most
seductive form. In billboard advertising products are often associated
with totally unrelated benefits. For example, automobiles, cigarettes,
liquor, and a host of other products are frequently depicted as being
used by a man with the adoring approval of one or more beautiful
female admirers. The implicit message is that when a man uses these
products beautiful women will be attracted to him. Purchasers who
make economic decisions based on such unrealistic expectations buy
only frustration and disappointment.
Furthermore, with their great concentration on advertising liquor
and cigarettes, billboards are contributing to the public's use of prod-
ucts known to be harmful to health. In short, the great bulk of bill-
board advertising may lead not to a better informed and more fulfilled
citizenry, but to economic insecurity, frustration, and physical illness.
These are hardly socially desirable goals intended to help people
achieve a "materially satisfactory life" or to make "individual self-gov-
First Amendment in the Marketplace. Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression,
39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 443-48 (1970).
156. Baker, Commercial Speech: 4 Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV.
1, 43 n.146 (1976) (citing Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial
Speech and the Values ofFree Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 432-47 (1970)).
157. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Val-
ues ofFree Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 472 (1970).
158. Id. at 444.
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eminent more effective."' 159
Conclusion
The disposition of Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego will de-
pend not only on the California Supreme Court's analysis of the tradi-
tional due process considerations, but also on how the court interprets
and applies the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions on first
amendment protection of commercial speech. Not only is the San Di-
ego ordinance a reasonable exercise of the city's police power, but it is
consistent with the kind of time, place and manner regulations which
the Supreme Court has approved in recentcommercial-speech cases.
It is no more reasonable to lump all commercial speech together
and uniformly afford it first amendment protection than it was under
the Chrestensen doctrine to deny it all protection. Distinctions must be
made between one type of commercial speech and another. Billboards
are not only a unique form of speech; they are a unique form of adver-
tising, different from broadcasting, newspapers, pamphleteering, door-
to-door sales, sound trucks, and speeches. In many ways billboards
contribute less in terms of valuable information and add more in terms
of deterioration of the environment than any of the above media. The
California court should recognize this distinction and uphold San Di-
ego's ordinance,
159. Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L. REv.
1, 43 n.46 (1976).
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Postscript
While this Note was being printed, the California Supreme Court
rendered its decision in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego. 60 The
court held that San Diego's ordinance did not exceed the city's author-
ity under the police power. The court found that the goals of eliminat-
ing traffic hazards and improving the appearance of the city are proper
objectives and that the ordinance was reasonably related to those
objectives. Additionally, the court held that the total ban on off-site
billboards did not violate the first amendment.
The opinion makes a significant attempt to clear up much of the
confusion which has surrounded billboard regulation cases. For one
thing, the court said: "We hold as a matter of law that an ordinance
which eliminates billboards designed to be viewed from streets and
highways reasonably relates to traffic safety."' 6' This bold pronounce-
ment will make it unnecessary for courts to sift through the mass of
contradictory evidence that has developed on this question.
The court expressly repudiated the holding of Varney & Green v.
Williams 16 2 that aesthetic purposes alone cannot justify a prohibition
of billboards under the exercise of the police power. The court also
overruled Varney & Green's holding that the police power cannot be
used to totally exclude a lawful business. This position, the court held,
"conflicts with reality and with current views of the police power."' 163
The court refused to engage in any semantic argument regarding dis-
tinctions between a regulation and a prohibition. In doing so it recog-
nized the benefits of an aesthetically pleasing environment regardless
of the size of the city or the commercial nature of the area.
In deciding the first amendment issue, the court was strongly influ-
enced by a recent action of the United States Supreme Court wherein
an appeal that raised identical issues was dismissed for want of a sub-
stantial federal question. 164 In Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v.
Hulse, 65 New York's highest court upheld an ordinance banning all
off-site billboards throughout the Town of Southhampton. The court
reasoned that the United States Supreme Court has recognized that a
state may regulate the time, place and manner of commercial speech
"to effectuate a significant governmental interest" and that "the regula-
160. 23 Cal. 3d 762 (1979).
161. Id. at 772 (emphasis added).
162. 155 Cal. 318, 100 P. 867 (1909).
163. 23 Cal. 3d at 776.
164. Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulse, 99 Sup. Ct. 66 (1978).
165. 43 N.Y.2d 483, 373 N.E.2d 263, 402 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1977).
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tion of outdoor advertising for aesthetic purposes alone"'166 constitutes
such an interest.
Although the California Supreme Court found the United States
Supreme Court's dismissal of the Suffolk case a dispositive decision on
the merits, it went on to analyze the free speech aspects of the prohibi-
tion in terms of the California Constitution. Resting its conclusion on
the criteria laid out in Linmark167 and Virginia Board of Pharmacy,
168
the court concluded that the restriction served a significant governmen-
tal interest, did not attempt to regulate the content of speech, and left
open ample alternative channels for communication.
No conflict was found by the court between San Diego's ordinance
and the federal Highway Beautification Act 169 or the California Out-
door Advertising Act.' 70 The court found that the billboards required
to be removed under the ordinance were not billboards requiring com-
pensation under the federal and state acts for two reasons. First, the
billboards concerned were all located in commercial and industrial ar-
eas, and billboards in these areas fall under the purview of the state law
only when their removal is provided for in an agreement between the
state and the Secretary of Transportation. No such agreement was al-
leged in this case. Second, the court held that the federal law does not
require payment of just compensation when the removal of billboards
is mandated not by state law but by local zoning ordinance.
The court also disposed of the advertisers' contentions that the
city's failure to pay compensation was a denial of equal protection, that
the amortization period prescribed by the ordinance for an abatement of
billboards was unreasonable, and that the ordinance is invalidated by
San Diego's failure to comply with the California Environmental Qual-
ity Act.
This decision' 7' represents an affirmative effort on the part of the
California Supreme Court to resolve some of the issues which have
been plaguing the courts of this state in billboard regulation cases since
early in the century. It is a modern decision that succeeds in recon-
ciling the United States Supreme Court's latest articulation of the com-
mercial speech doctrine with the current scope of the police power as a
tool for improving the "quality of metropolitan life."'
72
166. Id at 489, 373 N.E.2d at 265, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 370-71.
167. Linmark Assocs., Inc., v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
168. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
169. 23 U.S.C. §§ 131-136 (1977).
170. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 5200-5363, 5400-5406 (West 1974).
171. The opinion, written by Justice Tobriner, was concurred in by Chief Justice Bird
and by Justices Mosk and Manuel. Justice Newman concurred in the result; Justice
Richardson filed a separate concurring opinion; and Justice Clark filed a dissenting opinion.
172. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 23 Cal. 3d 762 (1979).
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